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Abstract—While the field of algorithmic fairness has brought
forth many ways to measure and improve the fairness of machine
learning models, these findings are still not widely used in
practice. We suspect that one reason for this is that the field of
algorithmic fairness came up with a lot of definitions of fairness,
which are difficult to navigate. The goal of this paper is to provide
data scientists with an accessible introduction to group fairness
metrics and to give some insight into the philosophical reasoning
for caring about these metrics. We will do this by considering in
which sense socio-demographic groups are compared for making
a statement on fairness.
Index Terms—algorithmic fairness, group fairness, statistical
parity, independence, separation, sufficiency
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of algorithmic fairness is, to a large extent,
concerned with the fairness of Automated Decision-Making
(ADM) systems. ADM refers to the process of making de-
cisions about individuals in an automated way based on the
data that is available about these individuals. Examples are
the automated approval of credit loan applications based on,
e.g., the credit loan history and income of the applicant,
the automated acceptance to universities based on grades
and standardized test scores or the automated invitation of
applicants to job interviews based on their CV. ADM typically
involves a prediction Ŷ of a non-observable feature Y of
individuals. An example of this would be the prediction Ŷ
of whether or not a credit loan applicant would repay the
loan they applied for. The automated decision is then based
on this prediction. In many instances, it has been shown that
such prediction-based decision systems lead to unintended
unfairness and discrimination (see, e.g., [1], [2] for specific
cases of unintended algorithmic discrimination or see [3] for
an overview of the topic). These instances have made clear
that the fairness properties of such decision systems have to
be studied since fairness is not achieved automatically, but has
to be consciously implemented.
Our paper provides data scientists with an entry point to
the many metrics that fall into the category of group fairness.
Measures in this category evaluate ADM system’s decisions
with respect to different socio-demographic groups (e.g., dif-
ferent gender or racial groups). The basic question is: Are there
systematic differences in the decisions for the groups? When
evaluating fairness through group fairness metrics, we thus
always compare groups and look for differences in treatment.
We analyze the metrics not by focusing on their mathematical
definitions, but by looking at how exactly the decisions for
socio-demographic groups are compared to each other by the
given fairness metrics as this provides a basis for a moral
interpretation. To help data scientists answer the question
”What fairness measures should I care about, and why?”, we
will provide a short (and necessarily incomplete) introduction
to the philosophical arguments that have been made about the
discussed fairness metrics.
II. RELATED WORK
The fairness discussion is not a new discussion that ap-
peared with the increased usage of ADM systems. Quite
the opposite is true: Questions of fairness and justice have
been discussed for thousands of years, with a long history
in philosophy, sociology, law etc. However, ADM systems
require quantitative measures of fairness, and the algorithmic
fairness literature of the last years has brought forward many
different such measures: In [4], Arvind Narayanan discusses
21 fairness metrics, but notes that there are many more. The
fairness auditing tool AIF360 claims to ”[include] over 71
bias detection metrics” [5, p. 2]. However, it can be difficult
to understand the specifics of these different fairness measures
that have been proposed in the literature and are implemented
in state-of-the-art tools. Some publications try to categorize
fairness measures (see, e.g., [6], [7]), but these works usually
lack intuitive explanations of the moral reasons to enforce
the discussed fairness measures and instead focus on their
mathematical definitions. This may create confusion on the
side of practitioners about how to implement fairness in their
data-based decision algorithms.
There is already a considerable amount of literature that
discusses different fairness measures and in particular group
fairness measures, which we focus on in this paper. Since most
group fairness metrics are calculated from the values found in
confusion matrices, existing literature oftentimes approaches
the introduction of different group fairness measures from this
angle: They show how these measures can be calculated from
the confusion matrix (see, e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]).
Recent research (see [12], [13]), however, experimentally
showed that confusion matrices are not intuitive and that it
takes time to fully understand them. From this, we conclude
that it is hard to grasp the moral meaning of fairness metrics
based on confusion matrices. Another explanatory approach
is chosen in [14]: Here, the authors define common group
fairness measures as (conditional) independence statements.
While this approach is formally very elegant, it is difficult to
interpret with respect to the concept of fairness and justice
that is represented by each metric.
Our paper attempts to introduce group fairness metrics in a
more intuitive way by showing that each metric corresponds
to an analysis of the decisions made about a specific part
(”subpopulation”) of the population on which the system
operates. For example, we might consider all members of the
population, or only those who are negatively affected by the
decision algorithm. We argue that it is exactly this choice of
the subpopulation which establishes which theory of fairness
a specific metric aligns with.
III. WHAT IS A ”FAIR ADM SYSTEM”?
The question of what constitutes fairness is a heavily
debated philosophical question. In this section, we will first
show that the intuitive interpretation of fairness as non-
discrimination cannot be easily applied to the field of algorith-
mic fairness. We then introduce another philosophical concept,
egalitarianism, which can be applied to understand when ADM
systems are considered to be unfair.
A. Non-discrimination
Often, fairness is equated with non-discrimination, which
is legally defined in anti-discrimination laws. Article 8 of
the Swiss federal constitution, for example, states that ”no
person may be discriminated against, in particular on grounds
of origin, race, gender, age, language, social position, way of
life, religious, ideological, or political convictions, or because
of a physical, mental or psychological disability.” The law thus
defines several properties on which discrimination is specifi-
cally prohibited. We will refer to these as sensitive attributes
(e.g. origin, race and gender). While equating fairness with
non-discrimination seems intuitive, it turns out that the philo-
sophical concept of discrimination is actually not applicable
to ”unfair” machine learning (see [15] for a detailed analysis).
One of the reasons that Reuben Binns [15] gives for this is
that one may see discrimination as morally wrong only when
it is intentional. However, it is difficult to speak of intention
in the case of ADM systems which we would typically not
portray as conscious, autonomous actors. The questions that
this finding leaves us with are: What is fairness in ADM
systems if the philosophical concept of non-discrimination
cannot be applied? On what philosophical grounds should an
ADM system be assessed?
B. Egalitarianism
A philosophical concept that might better help us understand
when ADM systems are unfair is egalitarianism. Binns de-
scribes egalitarianism as ”the idea that people should be treated
equally, and (sometimes) that certain valuable things should
be equally distributed” [15, p. 5]. As he further argues, this
does not prohibit inequalities. Distributive inequalities might
sometimes be justified and considered to be fair. What fair
inequalities are cannot be objectively determined though –
instead it depends on the philosophical theory of justice one
holds. One may, for example, argue that differences between
people are only just if they are not caused by brute luck, such
as being born into a wealthy family (this view is known as luck
egalitarianism and defended by philosophers such as Ronald
Dworkin and G. A. Cohen, see, e.g., [16], [17]). On the other
side, one could claim that such inequalities are fair under cer-
tain circumstances (a definition of such circumstances is given
and defended by the American philosopher John Rawls [18]).
To summarize, fairness in ADM systems can be understood
as some form of equal treatment or equal distribution between
people. People, however, disagree about what constitutes equal
treatment, what justifies inequalities and how this should be
measured – which is how we end up with the many fairness
metrics we find in the literature [19].
IV. MEASURING FAIRNESS
Data-based decision algorithms typically operate in a con-
text where only partial information is available at the time of
decision making: The missing information Y is not available
and thus replaced by a prediction Ŷ , which is then used to
take a decision. However, this means that decisions might be
wrong on the individual level: a bank might give a loan to
someone who does not pay this loan back; a student might
be accepted to a college even though they do not succeed in
their studies there. When assessing the fairness of a decision
system, we may thus not be interested in random mistakes,
but in systematic patterns in the decision. In other words:
We may call a decision algorithm unfair if it systematically
disadvantages one group with respect to the other. This concept
is known as group fairness.
Since the decisions in the end still affect individuals, both
the philosophical theories of justice as well as the law tend
to discuss justice with respect to individuals. The algorithmic
fairness literature actually provides approaches for measuring
fairness on an individual level. The concept of individual
fairness, for example, asks whether ”similar” individuals re-
ceive ”similar” decisions (it is up to the decision-maker to
define what individuals and what decisions are considered
to be ”similar”) [20]. Counterfactual fairness asks whether
individuals would have received the same decision if they were
(born as) a member of another socio-demographic group [21].
In this paper, we focus on group fairness measures which
assess whether a certain property of the decision algorithm, av-
eraged over the members within different socio-demographic
groups, is equal across these groups. The averaging reveals
the systematic effects of the decision system. In the context of
this paper, we therefore define fairness as socio-demographic
groups having to be equal with respect to a certain property
of the ADM system.
V. UNDERSTANDING GROUP FAIRNESS MEASURES
Group fairness in the context of data-based decision making
means comparing how different socio-demographic groups are
treated by the ADM system. In this section, we analyze how
exactly socio-demographic groups can be compared in the
fairness-context. As it turns out, there are different options,
and each one constitutes its own ”fairness metric” (or ”fairness
measure”). We also note that there are similarities between
some metrics which lead to the broader category of ”fairness
criteria” [14].
Table I provides an overview of the fairness metrics we
discuss in this section. Each fairness metric that we consider
is based on three elements:
• The definition of socio-demographic groups to be com-
pared: The choice of which socio-demographic groups
are compared is crucial. By, for example, comparing only
women and men, unfair treatment of non-binary people
cannot be detected. By comparing different gender groups
and, in a separate evaluation, different racial groups,
we might not notice that black women are particularly
harmed by a system [22].
• The relevant subpopulation on which those groups are
compared: This could, for example, be the subpopulation
of people negatively affected by the decision.
• The relevant comparison property: The definition of
what should be equal when comparing these socio-
demographic groups.
We will see that the metrics differ in the second and third
element, which provides an intuitive, hands-on understanding
of these metrics. This understanding of the metrics helps us in
taking a step towards answering the arguably biggest question
in implementing group fairness metrics: Which metric should
one aim to fulfill?
Our discussion of the fairness metrics will be based on
the example of credit lending. We assume that a machine
learning model predicts whether or not an applicant pays back
their loan (Ŷ ). The model has been trained on a training
set consisting of the sensitive attribute A, which in our case
is the gender of the applicant (to simplify the explanation,
we assume that we only compare female to male applicants),
additional attributes ~X , such as their credit history and income,
and the binary indicator Y of whether or not the applicant
repaid their loan. A subsequent decision algorithm then takes
the decision D (whether a given applicant should receive a
loan) based on the prediction Ŷ (calculated from the features
~X and A), combined with business related parameters such
as current interest rates.1 This decision model is tested with
a representative pool of credit loan applicants consisting of
women and men by checking for systematic differences in the
decision pattern. Hereinafter, we will refer to this testing data
as the ”full population” and to parts of it as ”subpopulations”.
1A large part of the algorithmic fairness literature is focused on cases where
D, Y and A are binary. In the interest of making this paper as accessible
as possible, we will follow this convention and do not discuss more complex
settings.
The most obvious way to compare women and men is to
look at the decision outcomes for the full population, i.e., to
compare the decisions for all men of the population to the
decisions for all women of the population. This leads to the
fairness criterion called ”independence” (see [14] and Table
I), which is also known as ”statistical parity” or ”demographic
parity” in the case of classification. It answers the question:
Are women and men equally likely to get a loan?2 Note that
this does not require equal numbers of women and men to be
accepted, but equal shares of women and men to be accepted.
Instead of considering the full population, we might also
restrict the fairness analysis to subpopulations. For example,
we might ask for the probability of getting a loan in the
subpopulation of applicants with a stellar credit history and
high income (→ ”conditional statistical parity”) or in the
subpopulation of applicants who actually repay their loan
(i.e., ”good debtors” → ”true positive rate”). For a systematic
overview of the possible subpopulations, we recall the basic
structure of the decision problem, which is characterized by
the vector of variables (A, ~X, Y,D). While the variable A
defines the groups that are being compared (in our case:
men and women), all other variables might be used to define
subpopulations.
First, we might restrict the analysis to a subpopulation char-
acterized by a specific range of ~X . This leads to ”conditional
statistical parity” (see Table I).3
Another option is to restrict the fairness analysis to individ-
uals according to their value of Y , e.g., to individuals with
Y = 1. These individuals still differ in their value of D, i.e.
in whether their loan application is approved or not, and a
natural approach to check for group differences is to compare
the acceptance rate of men to that of women. However,
this is done only within the subpopulation of individuals
actually repaying their loan – it thus represents a fairness
assessment on the group of ”good debtors”. In the case of
binary classifiers, the combination of both resulting fairness
metrics (for the subpopulations of either Y = 0 or Y = 1) is
called ”separation” [14] (see Table I).
Finally, we might also restrict the analysis to individuals
with the same decision D, e.g. to individuals with D = 1. In
this case, assessing the average approval rate makes no sense.
What can be evaluated though is the average value of Y for
this subpopulation, i.e., the average repayment rate of people
with D = 1. Equal repayment rates among accepted female
and male credit applicants might be seen as a proof that the
decision does not lead to systematic bias. The combination of
both resulting fairness metrics (for the subpopulations of either
2Alternatively, we might ask whether women and men are equally likely to
be denied their credit loan application. In the case of statistical parity, equality
(inequality) in the acceptance rate implies equality (inequality) in the rejection
rate. Thus, assessing the rejection rate does not provide new information about
the fairness of the model – it just frames it in a different way. This is also
the case with the following metrics for which we compare the credit approval
rate. For better readability, we restrict the discussion to the approval rate.
3Even though conditional statistical parity is only a relaxation of statistical
parity [14] and as such might not demand another detailed explanation, we
add it to this list as it seems to hold intuitive value for many people. We see
this, for example, in discussions about the gender pay gap [23].
positive or negative decisions) is called ”sufficiency” [14] (see
Table I).
The important realization here is that there is a limited
number of ways to compare socio-demographic groups (here,
men and women) in the case of the decision problem with the
four variables A, ~X, Y,D. In fact, most of the group fairness
measures proposed in the literature fall into one of the three
categories of either independence, separation, or sufficiency
[14].4
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GROUP FAIRNESS MEASURES
Creating a fair decision system means enforcing one or
several fairness criteria by either manipulating the training
data, the prediction model or the decision rule. Note that en-
forcing all fairness metrics at the same time is a mathematical
impossibility in most cases (and thus essentially always in
practice) [14], [24], [25]. Therefore, we usually have to make
a choice between these fairness metrics. This choice needs a
justification, and this is a moral, not a technical, justification.
In the following we will discuss some justifications for the
different fairness criteria. Since the application context is
highly relevant for which justification is deemed the most
fitting one, it is not surprising that, in different contexts,
different fairness metrics might be suggested. Also, people
might differ in their views on which justification is valid.
However, the goal of this section is to make clear which
justifications are coupled with the different fairness criteria.
Note that we focus on fairness with respect to the decision
subjects, i.e., the people directly affected by the decision. What
is considered to be morally adequate for decision-makers or
wider society is a different discussion. One might, for example,
find that statistical parity would be fair towards the decision
subjects, but would mean a loss in performance of the ADM
system, which in turn would lead to an indefensible loss in
profit to the decision-maker. In this case, the moral assessment
of fairness metrics might differ for different stakeholders.
However, we will focus on what it means to be fair towards
the decision subjects. This discussion is by no means meant to
be exhaustive, since the philosophical literature on this topic
is still very much a work in progress.
a) Statistical parity: Several works (see, e.g., [26], [27],
[28], [29]) argue that if differences in predictive features ~X are
due to unjust historical injustices or unjust societal structures
(such as male students being more often encouraged to go into
STEM fields than their equally talented female counterparts),
then these differences should be corrected for by enforcing
statistical parity. [29] argues that past and current injustices
alone are, however, not sufficient for justifying enforcing
statistical parity: It is also crucial to consider the effects of
the intervention. For a case of medical treatment, they show
4Note that, formally, one might also assess the average Y (instead of the
average D) in the case of the full population. However, this metric does not
reflect a property of the decision algorithm, but rather a statistical property of
the population and is typically referred to as the ”base rate”. In our example,
it is the rate at which women and men in the dataset repay their credit loans.
that enforcing statistical parity might actually harm the already
underprivileged group.
Therefore, enforcing statistical parity might make sense
if (1) there are differences in ~X that are caused by unjust
circumstances and that would therefore, without intervention,
lead to unjustifiable and unjust differences in D, and if (2) this
intervention at least does not harm the already underprivileged
group.
b) Conditional statistical parity: As a relaxation of sta-
tistical parity, conditional statistical parity also assumes that
fairness means equality in the (average) decision for the two
groups. The difference is that equality of decisions should
only hold when controlling for some elements of ~X , called
”legitimate” attributes [30], [31]. Focusing on conditional
statistical parity is thus motivated by the assertion that dif-
ferences in certain attributes justify differences in the decision
D: statistical parity should hold, but only for people with,
e.g., a stellar credit history. However, the choice of legitimate
attributes has to be well-justified. When we, for example,
argue that differences in the credit history justify differences in
treatment, we might reason that people are fully responsible
for their credit history – which is an assumption that does
not necessarily hold. To see this, let us consider an example
provided in [26]: Assume that bank clerks are more lenient
with the repayment deadlines of men compared to women. In
this case, the credit history is unfit as a legitimate attribute as
it is biased. In fact, if we compared the credit repayment rates
of women and men with similar credit histories, we would find
that women repay their loans at a higher rate than men. One
may thus argue that the credit approval rate of women in this
subpopulation of individuals with similar credit scores should
be higher than that of men. Since conditional statistical parity
demands that female and male applicants with the same credit
history are accepted at the same rate, the metric would (in this
case) disadvantage female applicants.
We conclude that conditional statistical parity is appropriate
when the ”equal treatment” paradigm can justifiably be applied
to subpopulations defined by legitimate attributes (rather than
to the full population).
c) Separation: Separation is fundamentally different
from independence in that the ”equal treatment” paradigm is
conditioned on Y : Equal treatment should hold for individuals
with the same value of Y , but not necessarily when comparing
individuals with different Y . For example, one may argue
that it is not necessary that a credit lending system treats
women and men, on average, equally. Instead, it might be
sufficient if women and men, who repay their loan, are treated
equally and if women and men, who default on their loan,
are also treated equally. Thus, separation explicitly accepts
treatment differences based on Y and assume that they do
not constitute a source of unfairness per se. This is, for
example, the case when D is about granting a benefit or access
to resources, such as college admissions or job promotions,
where Y = 1 constitutes the main reason for D = 1, and this is
morally right. Note that a necessary condition for focusing on
separation is that Y is not biased with respect to A (as it would,
TABLE I
STRUCTURED OVERVIEW OF FAIRNESS METRICS
Fairness criterion Fairness metric Subpopulation Property Equation
Independence Statistical parity - P (D = 1) P (D = 1|A = a) = P (D = 1|A 6= a)
Relaxation of independence Conditional statistical parity ~X = x P (D = 1) P (D = 1| ~X = x,A = a) = P (D = 1| ~X = x,A 6= a)
Separation Parity of true positive rates Y = 1 P (D = 1) P (D = 1|Y = 1, A = a) = P (D = 1|Y = 1, A 6= a)Parity of false positive rates Y = 0 P (D = 1) P (D = 1|Y = 0, A = a) = P (D = 1|Y = 0, A 6= a)
Sufficiency Parity of positive predictive values D = 1 P (Y = 1) P (Y = 1|D = 1, A = a) = P (Y = 1|D = 1, A 6= a)Parity of false omission rates D = 0 P (Y = 1) P (Y = 1|D = 0, A = a) = P (Y = 1|D = 0, A 6= a)
for example, be the case if the bank was more lenient with the
credit repayment deadlines of men compared to women, so that
Y does not actually represent timely repayments, but a biased
view of it). [32] therefore argues that separation is appropriate
to use if Y corresponds to what morally justifies a beneficial
or harmful outcome. Sometimes, the moral justification is
given only if the individuals can be made responsible for
Y . However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, treating
people differently based on Y is morally justified even if they
are not responsible for their Y . For example, in health-care,
it may be morally legitimate to decide on giving a therapy to
people based on whether or not they will be cured through
the therapy (where whether or not they get cured corresponds
to Y ), irrespective of whether they are responsible for their
current health issues; in credit lending it may be considered
morally legitimate to deny a loan to someone who cannot
repay it, even if the individual is not morally responsible for
the failure to repay, etc.
Separation is therefore justified if we believe that inequal-
ities in treatment between groups are acceptable as long as
people with the same Y are treated equally.
d) Sufficiency: Focusing on sufficiency means looking
at the subpopulations defined by D and assessing them with
respect to Y . The decision system is considered fair if the
average propensity for Y = 1 is equal for both groups. For
the credit lending example, we assess whether the accepted
men have the same repayment rate as the accepted women
and whether the rejected men have the same repayment rate
as the rejected women. We first of all note that experimental
evidence has shown that sufficiency is oftentimes (close to)
fulfilled in unconstrained learning (i.e., whenever there is no
specific intervention to achieve a certain kind of fairness) [33].
Let us now think about what assumptions would morally
justify enforcing sufficiency. For this, we consider the motiva-
tion behind a relaxation of sufficiency which is often used in
practice, e.g., in measuring bias in policing [34]: the ”outcome
test” (which aligns with testing for equality in positive predic-
tive values (PPVs)). The test was proposed by the American
economist Gary Becker [35] to measure discrimination in
credit lending. As an example, assume that a bank estimates
each credit loan applicant’s repayment probability and gives a
loan to men if they have a repayment probability above 30%,
but to women only if their repayment probability is above
70%. In this case, it seems clear that women, who receive
a loan, repay it at a much higher rate than men. Since in
real life the thresholds above which the bank grants loans to
women and men are not known, the observation of different
repayment rates might be used to infer a systematic difference
in how women and men are treated. However, differences in
repayment rates do not mathematically guarantee differences
in thresholds because many different combinations of individu-
als who apply for a loan and thresholds could lead to the same
results in the outcome test. This is what is known as the infra-
marginality problem.5 Therefore, the intuition that different
threshold have been applied when sufficiency is violated does
not hold. [34] shows that this is not only a theoretical issue,
but also a practical one. Since sufficiency does not measure
differences in thresholds, it is still unclear why sufficiency
would be morally relevant in the fairness discussion.
A possible argument for focusing on sufficiency is given in
[32]. According to the generalized theory in [32], sufficiency
is appropriate when a different decision D justifies different
expectations for the individuals of obtaining a given (beneficial
or harmful) outcome Y . This might be plausible when the de-
cision D corresponds to the decision to give a recommendation
or warning message such as ”it is dangerous for you to rent
this Ferrari”. In this case, it is morally appropriate for people
to have different expectations of getting hurt in driving the car
depending on whether they got this warning message or not.
People who receive the message, for example, rightly expect
that they are more likely to get hurt than people who do not
receive the message. This affects the kind of moral complaint
they may have against the rental company if they still decide
to drive the car.
Sufficiency therefore appears to be appropriate if we believe
that the individuals about whom decisions are made justly have
different expectations of their Y depending on their D.
VII. CONCLUSION
We provided an introduction to group fairness for data sci-
entists by considering how different socio-demographic groups
may be compared in the context of prediction-based decision
systems. In particular, we focused on the question of what parts
of the full population are pertinent for assessing the question
of fairness. Starting from the formal definition of a prediction-
based decision problem with the variables A, ~X, Y,D, we
described six fairness metrics that cover different perspectives
of how to compare socio-demographic groups with respect to
decision fairness. In line with existing literature, we pointed
to three broad categories of group fairness under which these
5For more detailed information on this problem and a way to infer the
thresholds from the data, see [34].
metrics fall: independence, separation and sufficiency. This
approach to group fairness can help practitioners understand
the choices they have if they want to enforce a group fairness
metric. Since the literature on philosophical guidance is not
evolved enough yet to provide concise rules for when to apply
each criterion, we provided some pointers to aspects that have
to be considered when choosing a fairness metric.
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